Churchill and the Dardenelles - Revision history

Paulreed at 18:00, 28 October 2019

2019-10-28T18:00:12Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:00, 28 October 2019
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	Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as [[Churchill Index#Kitchener\|Kitchener]] He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, [[Churchill Index#Fisher\|Fisher]]. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, [[Churchill Index#Asquith\|Asquith]], although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as [[Churchill Index#Kitchener\|Kitchener]] He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, [[Churchill Index#Fisher\|Fisher]]. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, [[Churchill Index#Asquith\|Asquith]], although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.

	[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]		[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]
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	[[File:anzaccove.jpg\|left]]		[[File:anzaccove.jpg\|left]]

	The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits ~~of the~~ failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.		The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits he failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.

	~~===Critique===~~

	You have provided a very good and well argued answer within the confines of the short word limit. All of your references are appropriate and useful and you’ve discussed the significance of each document well, and have related them to the question posed. You rightly say that there was actually some logic to the plan, although it clearly failed. The casualties on the western front were mounting daily and there seemed to be no end to the slaughter. If the Balkans could have been opened up to the allies by knocking Turkey out of the war then possibly the war could be shortened. You are also right to say that one of the key planks of Churchill’s argument concerning the decision-making process was that it was a collective decision in the war council. Moreover it was clear that there was very little unity or consistency in the war council between the competing views of Kitchener and Fisher. Kitchener, in particular, seemed reluctant to contribute enough soldiers to back up the naval assault. Since he had over fifteen years of professional political experience Churchill was hardly a ‘political amateur’, and the scheme had been planned by the war council, which involved military as well as civilian figures. This assertion in the question reflected the view of Churchill’s political enemies who wished to destroy him. It was, however, a question of honour and political responsibility which prompted Churchill to resign as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the fact that he had made bad decisions, although not all of them alone. Thanks for a great contribution.

			===Commentary===

			There was actually some logic to the plan, although it clearly failed. The casualties on the western front were mounting daily and there seemed to be no end to the slaughter. If the Balkans could have been opened up to the allies by knocking Turkey out of the war then possibly the war could be shortened. One of the key planks of Churchill’s argument concerning the decision-making process was that it was a collective decision in the war council. Moreover it was clear that there was very little unity or consistency in the war council between the competing views of Kitchener and Fisher. Kitchener, in particular, seemed reluctant to contribute enough soldiers to back up the naval assault. Since he had over fifteen years of professional political experience Churchill was hardly a ‘political amateur’, and the scheme had been planned by the war council, which involved military as well as civilian figures. This assertion in the question reflected the view of Churchill’s political enemies who wished to destroy him. It was, however, a question of honour and political responsibility which prompted Churchill to resign as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the fact that he had made bad decisions, although not all of them alone.

	[[Category:Churchill]]		[[Category:Churchill]]
	[[Category:Places]]		[[Category:Places]]

Paulreed at 16:05, 19 October 2012

2012-10-19T16:05:36Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:05, 19 October 2012
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	[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]		[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]
	Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence.		Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence.

			{{
			#display_point:
			40.2, 26.4
			\|width=25%
			\|zoom=4
			}}


	The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”		The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”
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	[[Category:Churchill]]		[[Category:Churchill]]
			[[Category:Places]]

Paulreed at 15:54, 19 October 2012

2012-10-19T15:54:24Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:54, 19 October 2012
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	'''To what extent do documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a		'''To what extent do documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?'''
	political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?'''

	Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.

Paulreed at 15:54, 19 October 2012

2012-10-19T15:54:05Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:54, 19 October 2012
Line 1:		Line 1:
	To what extent do ~~these~~ documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a		'''To what extent do documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a
	political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?		political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?'''

	Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as [[Churchill Index#Kitchener\|Kitchener]] He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, [[Churchill Index#Fisher\|Fisher]]. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, [[Churchill Index#Asquith\|Asquith]], although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as [[Churchill Index#Kitchener\|Kitchener]] He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, [[Churchill Index#Fisher\|Fisher]]. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, [[Churchill Index#Asquith\|Asquith]], although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.
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	The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.		The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.

	===~~Tutor feedback~~===		===Critique===

	You have provided a very good and well argued answer within the confines of the short word limit. All of your references are appropriate and useful and you’ve discussed the significance of each document well, and have related them to the question posed. You rightly say that there was actually some logic to the plan, although it clearly failed. The casualties on the western front were mounting daily and there seemed to be no end to the slaughter. If the Balkans could have been opened up to the allies by knocking Turkey out of the war then possibly the war could be shortened. You are also right to say that one of the key planks of Churchill’s argument concerning the decision-making process was that it was a collective decision in the war council. Moreover it was clear that there was very little unity or consistency in the war council between the competing views of Kitchener and Fisher. Kitchener, in particular, seemed reluctant to contribute enough soldiers to back up the naval assault. Since he had over fifteen years of professional political experience Churchill was hardly a ‘political amateur’, and the scheme had been planned by the war council, which involved military as well as civilian figures. This assertion in the question reflected the view of Churchill’s political enemies who wished to destroy him. It was, however, a question of honour and political responsibility which prompted Churchill to resign as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the fact that he had made bad decisions, although not all of them alone. Thanks for a great contribution ~~and I very much look forward to reading your second assignment soon~~.		You have provided a very good and well argued answer within the confines of the short word limit. All of your references are appropriate and useful and you’ve discussed the significance of each document well, and have related them to the question posed. You rightly say that there was actually some logic to the plan, although it clearly failed. The casualties on the western front were mounting daily and there seemed to be no end to the slaughter. If the Balkans could have been opened up to the allies by knocking Turkey out of the war then possibly the war could be shortened. You are also right to say that one of the key planks of Churchill’s argument concerning the decision-making process was that it was a collective decision in the war council. Moreover it was clear that there was very little unity or consistency in the war council between the competing views of Kitchener and Fisher. Kitchener, in particular, seemed reluctant to contribute enough soldiers to back up the naval assault. Since he had over fifteen years of professional political experience Churchill was hardly a ‘political amateur’, and the scheme had been planned by the war council, which involved military as well as civilian figures. This assertion in the question reflected the view of Churchill’s political enemies who wished to destroy him. It was, however, a question of honour and political responsibility which prompted Churchill to resign as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the fact that he had made bad decisions, although not all of them alone. Thanks for a great contribution.

	~~Carl Wade~~


	[[Category:Churchill]]		[[Category:Churchill]]

Paulreed at 21:41, 22 December 2010

2010-12-22T21:41:43Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:41, 22 December 2010
Line 1:		Line 1:
	To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a		To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a
	political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?		political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?
	Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the [[Churchill Index#Dardanelles\|Dardanelles]] campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as [[Churchill Index#Kitchener\|Kitchener]] He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, [[Churchill Index#Fisher\|Fisher]]. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, [[Churchill Index#Asquith\|Asquith]], although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.

	[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]		[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]

Paulreed at 21:37, 22 December 2010

2010-12-22T21:37:30Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:37, 22 December 2010
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	Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.

			[[File:Gallipolimap.png\|right]]
	Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence.		Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence.

	The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”		The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”

			[[File:anzaccove.jpg\|left]]

	The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.		The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.

Paulreed at 18:48, 20 December 2010

2010-12-20T18:48:11Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:48, 20 December 2010
Line 4:		Line 4:
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.
	Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence.		Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence.

	The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”		The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”

	The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.		The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.

			===Tutor feedback===

			You have provided a very good and well argued answer within the confines of the short word limit. All of your references are appropriate and useful and you’ve discussed the significance of each document well, and have related them to the question posed. You rightly say that there was actually some logic to the plan, although it clearly failed. The casualties on the western front were mounting daily and there seemed to be no end to the slaughter. If the Balkans could have been opened up to the allies by knocking Turkey out of the war then possibly the war could be shortened. You are also right to say that one of the key planks of Churchill’s argument concerning the decision-making process was that it was a collective decision in the war council. Moreover it was clear that there was very little unity or consistency in the war council between the competing views of Kitchener and Fisher. Kitchener, in particular, seemed reluctant to contribute enough soldiers to back up the naval assault. Since he had over fifteen years of professional political experience Churchill was hardly a ‘political amateur’, and the scheme had been planned by the war council, which involved military as well as civilian figures. This assertion in the question reflected the view of Churchill’s political enemies who wished to destroy him. It was, however, a question of honour and political responsibility which prompted Churchill to resign as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the fact that he had made bad decisions, although not all of them alone. Thanks for a great contribution and I very much look forward to reading your second assignment soon.

			Carl Wade


	[[Category:Churchill]]		[[Category:Churchill]]

Paulreed at 18:34, 19 December 2010

2010-12-19T18:34:46Z

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	To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?		To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a
			political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?
	Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.

Paulreed at 18:34, 19 December 2010

2010-12-19T18:34:19Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:34, 19 December 2010
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	To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?		To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?
	Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.		Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles.
	When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.		When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others.

Paulreed at 18:33, 19 December 2010

2010-12-19T18:33:02Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:33, 19 December 2010
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	The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”		The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success”
	The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.		The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.


			[[Category:Churchill]]